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1.  Introduction 
Total spending in the European Union (EU) on the Common Agricultural Policy 
(CAP) in 2008 was in excess of €52 billion and spending on “direct aids” alone was 
almost €37 billion, a large share of the total EU budget (Table 1). These payments were 
initially introduced as “compensation payments” to farms as the EU has lowered import 
tariffs and price support, and have been reformed since - in the process of which the word 
“compensation” was dropped. To understand this we need to take a brief historical tour on 
agricultural policies in the EU.  
The CAP was designed in the late 1950s and introduced in the late 1960s.  The 
official objectives as stated in Article 33 (39) of the EC Rome Treaty (1958) are:  
1.  to increase agricultural productivity by promoting technical progress and 
ensuring the optimum use of the factors of production, in particular labour;  
2.  to ensure a fair standard of living for farmers;  
3.  to stabilize markets;  
4.  to assure the availability of supplies;  
5.  to ensure reasonable prices for consumers.  
The CAP resulted from the integration of various pre-EU member state policies 
which were introduced to protect EU farmers’ income and employment from foreign 
competition and market forces.  Figure 1 shows the long term evolution of agricultural 
protection in Europe and clearly illustrates how protection increased very rapidly in the 
post-World War II decades. Political economists have explained this growth in protection 
by the decline in farm incomes compared to rapidly growing incomes in the rest of 
society as well as the declining opposition of consumers and industry to tariff protection 
for agricultural commodities (Swinnen 2009).  Hence, the main objective of agricultural 
policies in the EU, and the main determinant of the level of agricultural protection was   3
provision of compensation and support to a sector in (relative) economic decline in order 
to protect incomes and employment from market forces.   
The mechanism of support was through high income tariffs, export subsidies and 
fixing prices. While this created much stability on the EU market (directly related to 
objective 3 of the CAP objectives) it created much instability on world markets, and 
considerable distortions throughout the economy.  
Since the integration of agriculture in the GATT/WTO the CAP instruments have 
undergone major reforms, including the introduction of compensation payments in the 
1990s and the move to decoupled payments with the 2003 and 2008 reforms. The reforms 
in the 1990s and 2000s have substantially reduced the trade distortions of the CAP, in 
particularly through the decoupling of the “single farm payments” (SFP) which are 
currently applied in the EU-15, and which are to be implemented by the New Member 
States (NMS) in the coming years.  
However, what is important is that the level of these payments are still very much 
influenced by the initial objective of supporting incomes and employment in agriculture. 
To understand this, we will briefly review the initial policies and the reforms since the 
start of the CAP.  
 
 
2.  The History of CAP Policy Instruments and Reforms 
When the CAP was designed at the end of the 1950s and initially implemented in 
the 1960s the essence was a system of government interventions in the market to support 
a minimum price for farmers. This domestic intervention system was accompanied by 
trade measures to make it work: variable import tariffs (“levies”) and export subsidies   4
(“refunds”) were set to isolate this system from international markets. The system (and 
the names given to the various instruments) differed between commodities. The most 
profound interventions occurred in markets of sugar, beef, dairy, wine, cereals and 
oilseeds. Table 2 gives an overview of the main instruments used for the implementation 
of the CAP in different agricultural productions. 
Intervention prices were set considerably above market prices. For some 
commodities, such as butter and white sugar, EU prices were four times the price on the 
world market, but also for other commodities EU prices largely exceeded world market 
prices. Table 3 gives the differences between the EU price and the world market price for 
selected commodities in 1967-1968. This price structure resulted in a large increase in 
agricultural production. Between 1973 and 1988, the volume of agricultural production 
increased by 2% per annum whereas internal consumption increased only by 5%. This 
resulted already at the end of the 1970s in a high degree of self sufficiency (Figure 2) and 
the EU shifted from a net import to a net export position in agricultural and food products. 
In combination these contributed to rapidly growing budgetary expenditures (for market 
intervention, storage, export subsidies, etc.) and distortions of international markets. Both 
resulted in pressures for reforms. These reforms and also the future of the CAP are still 
dominated by the early outline of the CAP, not only in terms of dealing with the surplus 
production and the environmental problems caused by intensive farming practices, but 
also regarding farmers’ attitude towards price policy (Fennell 1997).  
Reforms of the CAP were proposed soon after its introduction. As early as 1968, 
Commissioner Mansholt proposed a plan to accelerate structural change in the 
agricultural sector. The main proposals in the plan were to implement monetary 
incentives to encourage about half of the farming population to leave the sector by taking 
early retirement or engage in alternative employment. In addition, he proposed that aid   5
only should be provided to a farmers that had a sufficient scale or farmers that engaged in 
a large jointly-managed holding. However, strong opposition from farmers caused 
governments and the European Council to reject the proposal (Stead 2007).  
To deal with the growing surpluses, in the mid 1980s production quota were 
imposed in the sugar and dairy markets to control supply (and thus the budgetary effects 
and market distortions), while maintaining high support prices. Extension of this system 
to the cereals market was considered but the transaction costs (for monitoring, 
administration and enforcement) of the system were deemed too high to be practical in 
the cereals market.  
With the integration of agriculture in the GATT, pressure from trading partners also 
grew. Ultimately, a new approach was decided by lowering support prices to reduce 
market distortions and compensating farmers through “compensation payments” - later 
referred to as “direct payments” - linked to the area used (for e.g. cereals and oilseeds) or 
to animals (for beef). This was the most important part of the so-called MacSharry 
reforms in 1992. 
The Agenda 2000 reforms basically represented a deepening and extension of the 
1992 reforms (Ahner and Scheele 2000). Price support was reduced further for cereals 
and beef and the direct payments in these sectors were increased to compensate farmers at 
least partially for the price cuts. A similar reform with price cuts and the introduction of 
direct payments was initiated in the milk sector, but only from 2005 onwards. The reform 
was necessary because of several reasons (Swinnen 2002, Van Meijl and Van Tongeren 
2002). First, the enlargement of the EU with ten Eastern European countries, which still 
had a relatively high share of agricultural in total production and employment, would 
have unsustainable budget implications if the CAP was not reformed.  Second, without   6
additional reforms the EU would not fulfill the commitments made under the GATT 
Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture (URAA).  
The combined result of the MacSharry and Agenda 2000 reforms implied, at least 
for the sectors concerned, a major shift from support trough price and market 
interventions to farm support trough direct payments.  
The relative share of the EU agricultural budget in the total EU budget has declined 
somewhat (Figure 3). However, table 4 shows that the total amount of support to 
agriculture has not declined. Moreover, some argue that support to agriculture has 
increased more than indicated by the numbers in table 4, because compensation trough 
direct payments was based on gross revenue declines, while net incomes have declined 
much less.
1 
Figure 4 also indicates the growth in expenditures on rural development. The 
Agenda 2000 decisions imply a “considerable overhauling, streamlining, and 
consolidation” of the EU development policy under the CAP (Ahner and Scheele 2000). 
More than the increase in budgetary allocations, which remains moderate compared to the 
other expenditures, the growing importance of rural development seemed to follow from 
the official reference to it as the ‘second pillar of the CAP’. 
There were several reforms prepared and implemented over the two terms when 
Franz Fischler was Commissioner for Agriculture and Rural Development of the EU, 
which spanned almost a decade (1996-2004). Some of these reforms, such as the Agenda 
2000 package, were important. However, his name is most associated with the reform of 
2003, which, at the time, was generally referred to as the “Mid Term Review”, a term 
                                                 
1 For example, OECD calculations on transfer efficiencies of OECD agricultural policies suggest that the 
average net income gains from market and price support in OECD countries was only 20% (OECD 1997). 
This means that, after factor markets etc. have adjusted to the new situation, a gross income decline, of say, 
€100 is causing a smaller net income decline. Hence compensation based on gross income decline is 
overcompensating, the extent of which depends on the transfer efficiency of direct payments, which are also 
less than 100%.    7
which, in hindsight, does not do justice to the extent and substance of the reform package 
that was decided in 2003. Those reforms were assessed as “ the most radical reform of the 
CAP”  since its creation (e.g. Olper 2008).  
The 2003 Fishler reforms contain the following key elements: 
1.  The key innovation was the introduction of the Single Farm Payment (SFP) on 
the basis of historical entitlements (although with some flexibility of 
application), decoupling a large share of CAP support from production. This 
reform essentially ensured that farms would continue to receive the amount of 
payments they received in the past but no longer linked to their production 
activities, but as a single “decoupled” payment.  
2.  New instruments called “cross-compliance” and “modulation” were introduced. 
Cross-compliance requirements are to ensure that SFP is only paid to farmers 
that abide by a series of regulations relating to environment, animal welfare, 
plant protection and food safety. Modulation refers to the shift of funds to rural 
development policies (i.e. from Pillar I to Pillar II) by limiting payments to the 
largest farms.  
3.  The reforms introduced changes in several market organizations, in particular 
in the dairy and rice sectors, by increasing dairy quotas and reducing rice 
support policies, replacing them by direct support to be integrated in the SFP.  
The 2008 “Health Check reform” introduced relatively minor changes expect for a 
substantial reform in the dairy sector.  
   8
3.  The WTO and the CAP 
Since the conclusion of the URAA in 1992, EU subsidies to agricultural production 
and exports are constrained by WTO rules. Among others, there are restrictions on the 
total support to agriculture and on both the amount of export subsidies and the volume of 
exports that can be subsidized.
2 
Several observers argue that the implementation of the WTO did not caused directly 
major trade and policy liberalization in the EU (Josling and Tangermann, 1999; 
Swinbank, 1999). Yet the URAA is an important factor for the CAP for several reasons. 
First, the URAA brought the link between the domestic policy aspects of the CAP and its 
international trade implications to the top of the policy agenda, something which was new 
in the EU at the time but which has since fundamentally changed CAP decision-making.  
Second, the URAA provided the key initiatives for the 1992 MacSharry reforms and, 
given the Eastern enlargement interactions with the WTO, for Agenda 2000 reform.
3 
Third, the URAA provided a framework for future negotiations.  A continuation of 
reductions in the subsidies under the next negotiation round could cause much more 
serious implications for the CAP. Many claim that the anticipation of this outcome was a 
crucial element in the 2003 Fischler reforms (Swinnen, 2008). 
 
 
                                                 
2 Under the URAA, a considerable amount of support in both the US and the EU was classified as “blue 
box” or “green box” support. The “green box” is a category of so-called “ non or minimally trade 
distorting” support policies. These green box support policies are not restricted under WTO rules. The “blue 
box” includes the EU direct payments which were introduced under the MacSharry and Agenda 2000 
reforms.  See for example, Burrell (2000); Josling and Tangermann (1999); Swinbank (1999) for more 
extensive discussions and analyses.  
 
3 See Swinnen (2002) for more details.   9
4.  CAP and Adjustment 
A key question is whether the CAP payments in the past have been effective in 
achieving its objectives of ensuring a “fair standard of living” and “stabilizing markets”.  
When one looks at the short run, the answer on the income question is obviously: yes. 
Annual payments do increase farms’ incomes – how can they not ?  And farm accounts 
and statistics will show that they can amount to a substantial share of farm net incomes 
for a given year, depending of course on the location and the specialization of the farms 
and the market situation of the particular year.   
However, this is a very unsatisfactory way of answering this question.  One should 
look at how the CAP payments affect (relative) farm household incomes in the long run.  
And then the answer is much less obvious. 
First, studies generally show that farm incomes (narrowly defined) are still behind 
average incomes but that farm household incomes are roughly the same (and sometimes 
higher) than average household incomes in the EU.  The reason is that non-farm incomes 
make up an increasingly larger share of “farm household incomes” with the improved 
integration of rural areas in the rest of the economy.  
Second, the reason why farm household incomes have grown is mostly due to the 
integration of rural areas and rural (output and factor) markets in the general economy 
over the past decades.  Integration of rural capital markets has reduced the cost of capital, 
integration of rural labor markets has improved access to non-farm employment 
opportunities for farm households, and integration of services has improved both incomes 
and the quality of living in rural areas. Note that none of these factors has much to do 
with CAP payments.
4  
                                                 
4 The same conclusions and mechanisms apply to other countries, including the USA (see various papers by 
Bruce Gardner).   10
Another indicator of the effectiveness of CAP payments in terms of supporting 
agricultural incomes and employment is to look at the evolution of agricultural 
employment. The employment effects can also be interpreted as a rough indicator of 
relative incomes (through revealed preferences: if people had a good income from 
farming, they would stay in agriculture). 
Figures 5 and 6 illustrate the decline in agricultural employment in the EU (we used 
data from some of the member states because EU total averages are strongly 
affected/distorted by enlargements). Over the past two decades, despite the CAP, 
employment in agriculture fell by 35% to 50%. Although one cannot draw definite 
conclusions from such visual analysis without looking at the counterfactual, the data do 
confirm that agricultural employment in the EU has declined very strongly over the past 
decades, despite the large CAP support.   
Long run studies using much more detailed data and sophisticated statistical 
techniques largely confirm this conclusion that CAP payments either had no effect or only 
a minor effect on employment.
5  In fact, what is interesting is that OECD data show, first, 
that over the past two decades (1987 – 2007 period) there is no positive relationship 
between (changes in) agricultural employment and (changes in) agricultural support 
(captured by the PSE indicator
6) across the OECD countries (see figures 7a and 7b).  
Moreover, over this period, there is actually a negative correlation between the change in 
agricultural support and the change in agricultural employment (see figure 7c) – which is 
inconsistent with the notion that agricultural support has a significant impact on 
agricultural employment in the long run.     
                                                 
5 See Tweeten (1979) and Barkley (1990) on the large employment reductions in the 1950s through the 
1980s in the USA despite massive government subsidies to agriculture; Glauben et al (2006) for Germany; 
other studies focusing on the nature of the farm subsidies find mixed, but generally small, effects (see e.g. 
Dewbre and Mishra (2002), Serra et al (2005).  
 
6 The PSE measures which share (in %) of the gross value of agricultural output is due to government 
support.    11
The reason why CAP payments have limited impact on relative farm incomes and 
employment is because of a combination of policy rent dissipation and poor targeting.   
OECD studies showed that the net income effects for farmers of commodity price 
supports (the old CAP) were around 20%, meaning that 80% of the payments ended up 
with non-farm groups, including input supplying companies and landowners (and reduced 
prices to non-EU consumers and producers).  This rent dissipation has improved (i.e. has 
been reduced) with the shift to area/animal payments and to single farm payments, but 
only so far, and not as much as the improvement in terms of output market distortions.  
The main reason is that these payments are still linked to land use and are driving up land 
prices.  For example, with the accession to the EU, land market prices and rents have 
increased very strongly in the NMS (between 100% and 300% - see figure 8
7).  While the 
current payments in the EU-15 are decoupled from production, they are not decoupled 
from land use and, thus, continued dissipation of policy rents from farms to landowners 
should be expected
8.  
Another factor is that much of the support goes to larger and typically better 
managed and more dynamic farms, often located in the richer areas of the EU.  Notice 
that the shift from price support to direct payments (either area or SFP) has not changed 
this outcome, because the payments are based on historical CAP benefits.
9  Hence, the 
farms that have the lowest incomes in the EU typically receive least of the CAP 
payments.   
 
                                                 
7 See Swinnen and Vranken (2009) on the impact of accession on NMS land markets. 
 
8 See Salhofer and Schmid (2004) for a formal analysis 
 
9 This argument depends on the implementation of the SFP (regional vs historical model) and modulation 
mitigates this effect somewhat.    12
Some conclusions from this analysis are as follows. Farm household incomes have 
caught up with those in the rest of society, but mostly because of other factors than CAP 
payments, i.e. the integration of rural areas in factor markets and the rest of the economy. 
Agricultural protection under the CAP (and the direct payments) have not been effective 
at protecting EU agricultural employment in the long run.  However, another 
interpretation of the same observation is that in a long run perspective CAP payments 
have not created major distortions in the economy in terms of keeping labor in agriculture 
that otherwise would have been employed more productively in the rest of the economy.   
These observations can be reconciled with each other in a political economy 
framework forwarded by the Berkeley/Cornell school (in particular by Gordon Rausser 
and Harry de Gorter and their collaborators).  They interpret the joint determination of 
agricultural support and investments in productivity-increasing investments and activities 
as a mutually reinforcing decision.  As people active in agriculture are hurt from 
productivity growth in agriculture (with inelastic demand) and in the rest of the economy, 
continued support for productivity growth (which is efficiency enhancing) needs to be 
complemented with support for sectors in relative decline (such as agriculture) in order to 
be politically sustainable.
10   
Finally, this brief historical review and the (political) economic analysis points at 
some crucial elements and fundamental arguments in the discussion on the future of the 
CAP payments. Many of the reports and studies which focus on the so-called “new 
objectives” of the CAP seem to ignore (accidentally or deliberately) the fundamental fact 
                                                 
 
10 See e.g. Rausser (1992), de Gorter, Nielson and Rausser (1992), and Swinnen and de Gorter (2002). In 
addition, Foster and Rausser (1993) argue that support instruments such as price supports that benefit the 
most efficient farms can be an efficient instrument from the perspective of reducing political opposition to 
growth enhancing investments while inducing the least efficient producers to leave the sector and the most 
efficient producers to continue.  The CAP instruments, including the direct payment and historical SFP 
system – which are based on historical, i.e. price-support determined, levels of support, are consistent with 
these arguments (see also Harvey 2004).    13
that the amount of CAP payments that are currently spent are a direct consequence of the 
history of the CAP and its reforms. The introduction and size of compensation payments 
was to compensate farmers for income losses due to the removal of price distortions that 
existed under the 1970s and 1980s CAP. Since these instruments and the derived 
payments were introduced with as main objective to support farm incomes, employment, 
and protect EU farmers against foreign competition, one should first address whether this 
is no longer an objective – and, if not, why do we need to continue the level of payments 
which has mostly been determined by these objectives.  
 
Stabilizing Markets and Incomes ? 
Another important issue is the role that CAP subsidies play in stabilizing markets 
and incomes.  As explained above stabilizing markets was one of the initial formal 
objectives of the CAP.  The dramatic changes (both increases and decreases) in 
commodity and food markets over the past two years has raised concerns regarding the 
importance of addressing risk and uncertainty for farmers and other agents active in 
agricultural and food markets.  Many of the reports on the future of the CAP also mention 
the importance for intervention to provide stability to markets, farm incomes, and to 
provide a (social) safety net.   
The impact on stabilization is more nuanced.  It is important first to point out that 
reducing variability of prices, of incomes, and providing a safety net are not the same 
objective (they may even be conflicting).   The old CAP system of government price 
interventions reduced price variability on the internal EU market, but at a huge cost in 
terms of inducing market distortions (both internally and on the world market) and it did 
not provide a good safety net as most of the benefits went to larger farms and much less 
support went to farms with low incomes.      14
The current direct payment system has less or no impact on price variability, but 
does reduce income variability and reduces risk in farming households by providing a 
guaranteed source of income.
11  In terms of risk reduction and insurance provision, there 
are a variety of private sector instruments available, and the question is (a) whether direct 
payments do a better job at providing insurance than market-provided instruments, and 
(b) why such instruments should be focused on agriculture and not on other sectors of the 
economy which are also facing problems of variability in markets – for example from 
energy prices.   
In addition, the fact that direct payments provide an income guarantee does not 
imply that direct payments are an effective instrument to provide a social safety net – at 
least not under the current implementation.  In order to provide a safety net at the EU 
level, the level of income support should increase when farm incomes fall below a certain 
threshold level.  However, the direct payments are historically determined, based on the 
previous level of support which, at the farm-level, which has little correlation with the 
likelihood of the farm household’s income to fall below a certain income level.  In fact, 
given the historical distribution of farm support among regions and farms, the opposite is 
more likely to be the case: the most productive farms in regions where the most 
subsidized commodities were produced are most likely to have the highest level of 
payments.  If direct payments were to serve as a safety net, they would have to be linked 
to the level of income.  
 
 
                                                 
11 And as such, they may have an impact on production as they affect farm decisions in uncertain 
environments, although the size of the effect is likely to be relatively small (see e.g. Hennessy 1998; 
Goodwin and Mishra 2006; Sckokai and Moro 2006)   15
5.  The Future 
We are at a historic moment in time, both in terms of policy timing and in terms of 
the challenges that face us. This forces us to raise more fundamental questions regarding 
the CAP.  
Successive reforms of the CAP have been successful in reducing the market 
distortions caused by the CAP, from the price and market intervention system to the 
decoupled single farm payments. The question that we are facing now is whether the SFP 
system, either in its current form or in a modified form is likely to address the key 
challenges in the future. The most daunting challenges appear to be reducing/ mitigating 
climate change and producing sufficient, safe and high quality food.  
Past reforms have introduced some new official objectives in the CAP. In line with 
the requirements of EU citizens, the following factors have taken on greater importance, 
according to the European Commission (2007): improving the quality of Europe's food 
and guaranteeing food safety (standards); looking after the well-being of rural society; 
support the multifunctional role of farmers as suppliers of public goods to society and 
ensuring that the environment is protected; providing better animal health and welfare 
conditions; doing all this at minimal cost to the EU budget.
12  This additional list of new 
factors/objectives is reflected in pillar II priorities and the so-called cross-compliance 
regulations, i.e. the conditions farms have to satisfy in order to receive the payments.   
Regarding the future CAP, several task forces and reports have developed an even 
larger set of adjusted objectives for the CAP.  For example, Bureau and Mahé present a 
list of 13 policy objectives for their future CAP model (see table 5).  In contrast, the IEEP 
report (Baldock et al 2008) presents two main new objectives: (1) to maintain the EU’s 
                                                 
12 As listed in European Commission (2007), "The Common Agricultural Policy explained," Directorate for 
Agriculture, European Communities, Brussels. Available online: 
http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/publi/capexplained/cap_en.pdf   16
capacity to produce food and maintain a renewable resource base in the longer term, and 
(2) to provide environmental benefits (including biodiversity, valued landscapes, …).   
Needless to say, the extension of the list of objectives makes the entire exercise of 
identifying precise objectives and developing targeted instruments not easier – which is 
recognized by some of the authors of the reports – who then also list the need for 
simplicity and low transaction costs as additional factors to take into consideration.    
In Swinnen (2009) I review the objectives which are most often presented and 
which seem to be the ones with the most important budgetary and policy implications: 
food security and environmental benefits. I conclude that EU direct payments generally 
are not an effective way of dealing with these challenges. Food safety and quality 
objectives are addressed by other policies and direct payments have a very limited role to 
play in this.  
In terms of providing sufficient quantity of agricultural output, major challenges 
appear on the horizon. Even without government support for biofuels, demand for 
agricultural commodities for bio-energy purposes is likely to increase strongly in the long 
run - as we should expect oil prices to recover in the coming years. Similarly, the growth 
in food and feed demand from emerging countries, such as India and China, is likely to 
continue. Both fundamental developments are affected by the current financial and 
economic crises in the world economy, but in the longer term one should expect them to 
resume their critical importance. On the production side, productivity trends in the EU 
and other developed countries face declining growth rates. These fundamental trends will 
cause an upward pressure on agricultural and food prices. 
Furthermore, climate change is likely to have a significant impact on EU 
agriculture. Although it may actually have a positive effect on aggregate EU output in the 
medium term, it is likely to imply major relocations and the need to adjust production   17
systems. Vice versa, EU agriculture continues to contribute importantly to GHG 
emissions.  
From a policy perspective all this has important implications.
13 One implication is 
that real agricultural market prices are likely to increase in the future. As a result, there 
are less arguments for governments to support farm incomes. This in itself has major 
implications for the use of direct payments since their history and level have been 
determined by the perceived need and political demand for farm income support. 
Direct payments can play some role in reducing income variation and household 
risk in the future, but they would have to be reformed fundamentally in order to become a 
real safety net. Moreover, their effectiveness in terms of risk reduction and providing 
insurance has to be compared with private sector instruments, and their effectiveness in 
terms of social safety net has to be compared with that of an economy-wide social policy 
system, which provides a safety net across sectors. In both cases, policy and private sector 
instruments focused not on agriculture but on the entire economy are likely to be more 
efficient.  
Given the daunting challenges to produce more agricultural commodities for food 
and non-food purposes in combination with the challenges imposed by climate change 
and the lagging productivity growth rates in the EU, there is a strong case for support and 
investments in R&D and technology development and diffusion (a) to improve the 
lagging productivity of agricultural production, (b) to reduce the pressure of bio-energy 
on food prices, (c) to reduce the negative aspects of the relationship between agriculture 
and climate change, (d) to reduce energy-dependency in agricultural production, and (e) 
                                                 
13 These are in addition to potential consumer policies, such as advising a less meat-intensive diet.   18
to pursue these efficiency objectives while taking in account important (additional) 
environmental constraints and objectives. 
14 
In this perspective, the EU should consider instead of spending the budget on direct 
payments to reallocate a substantial part of the CAP budget to stimulate the development 
and implementation of a series of new and improved (“green”) technologies to stimulate 
the EU rural/food/bio-economy.
15 It appears that such strategy could have major spill-
over effects on the rest of the economy in potentially leading to overall productivity gains 
and improved environmental conditions.  
                                                 
14 This issue is becoming more important as agricultural commodity prices are linked stronger to energy 
prices then they were in the past - because there is now both a supply (cost) and a demand (bio-energy) link 
between energy and agricultural commodity prices. This increases the demand for farming technologies 
which are less energy-intensive or energy-related.  
 
15 Another important policy issue in this framework is whether biotechnology should be part of such EU 
policy for the future. If political objectives to biotechnology use in the EU agricultural- and bio-economy 
remain too strong, the need for the search for and investment in alternative technologies is even stronger.   19
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Table 1: CAP Budget 
Heading  Appropriations 2008  Appropriations 2007  Outturn 2006 
Commitments Payments  Commitments  Payments  Commitments  Payments 
Administrative expenditure of 
Agriculture and rural 
development policy area  
130 325 016 130 325 016 125 674 851 125 674 851 109 489 381,55 109 489 381,55 
Interventions in agricultural 
markets 
4 032 371 000 4 033 571 000 4 941 694 000 4 938 759 000 8 066 747 919,52 8 066 747 919,52 
Direct aids  36 832 000 000 36 832 000 000 37 066 533 000 37 066 533 000 34 051 330 746,02 34 051 330 746,02 
Rural development  12 926 551 889 11 379 281 817 9 897 556 092 9 657 686 782 11 931 312 505,15 11 328 848 347,59 
Pre-accession measures in the 
field of agriculture and rural 
development 
85 300 000 385 000 000 48 300 000 265 900 000 299 820 000,— 213 755 071,87 
International aspects of 
Agriculture and rural 
development policy area 
6 230 000 6 230 000 6 161 000 6 161 000 5 817 680,62 6 185 630,64 
Audit of agricultural 
expenditure 
-342 500 000 -342 500 000 -86 500 000 -86 500 000 -275 097 022,97 -275 108 092,85 
Policy strategy and 
coordination of Agriculture 
and rural development policy 
area  
31 450 000 34 060 500 41 174 000 41 149 756 36 557 969,78 37 214 746,82 
Administrative support for 
Agriculture Directorate-
General  
           
Total   53 701 727 905  52 457 968 333  52 040 592 943  52 015 364 389  54 225 979 179,67  53 538 463 751,16  
Source: European Commission 
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Table 2: The main instruments used for the implementation of the CAP - Selected products 
 Cereals
1 Sugar  Dairy
2 Beef/  Veal Sheep 
meat 







Intervention  X X X  X X  X
4 X
5 X 
Storage aid     X  X  X     X 
Direct aid  X
6  X X X  X
7 X
8  
Import levies and 
Export refunds 
X X X  X X





X X X           
Guarantee threshold  X           X
12  
Production quota   X  X           
1 Except rice 
2Arrangements generally applicable only in periods of large-scale marketing 
3 Only table wines are subject to the prices and intervention systems 
4 Intervention only in a “crisis situation”. Otherwise, “withdrawal” of surpluses at a low price 
5 No levies on imports 
6 For durum wheat produced in certain regions of Italy, Greece and France 
7 For citrus fruit 
8 Aid for processing of selected products, in some cases with a quantitative ceiling. The products concerned are various tomato derivates, dried figs, raisins, a particular type of 
prune, and preserves in syrup (cherries, peaches and William pears) 
9 In case of voluntary export restraints, levies may not exceed amounts laid down in the agreements 
10 For a limited number of products 
11 Provided that the import price is not lower than the relevant reference price, there are no levies on imports 
12 For aid for processing tomatoes 
Source: Rosenblatt 1988   24
Table 3: Prices for certain agricultural products in the EU compared to the world market 
price level in 1967/1968
a 
  EU Common price 
ECU/ 100kg (1) 
World market price 
ECU/ 100kg (2)
c 
(1) as a % of (2) 
Soft wheat  10.7  5.8  185 
Hard wheat
b 16.1 8.1 200 
Husked rice  18.0  15.3  117 
Barley 9.1  5.7  160 
Maize 9.0  5.6  160 
White sugar  22.3  5.1  438 
Beef 68.0  38.8  175 
Pig meat  56.7  38.6  147 
Poultry meat  72.3  55.0  131 
Eggs 51.1  38.7  132 
Butter 187.4  47.2  397 
Olive oil  115.6  69.8  166 
Oilseeds  20.2 10.1 200 
a reference price differs for various products 
b including direct production aids 
c wholesale entry price  
Source: Fennell 1997 
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Table 4: Support to EU agriculture (Total and Distribution) 
  1986-88 1989-91 1992-94 1995-97 1998-00 2001-03 2004-06 
TOTAL  SUPPORT  (PSE%)*  41 34 37 35 37 35 34 
O f   w h i c h   ( i n   % )          
Market Price Support and 
Payments based on Output  91 85 72 61 64 56 52 
Payments based on area 
planted/ animal numbers  3  7  19 31 29 34 14 
Payments based on Input Use  5  7  7  7  7  9  10 
Payments based on historical 
entitlements, input 
constraints and farm 
income** 
1 1 2 1 0 1  14 
* PSE%: Producer Subsidy Equivalent; measures total support to agriculture as a % of the production value 
** For 1991-1993 average, this category also includes miscellaneous payments (approx. 2% of total) 
Source: OECD 
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Table 5: List of CAP objectives proposed by Bureau and Mahé (2008) 
 
1.  To foster the economic performance and the competiveness of the farm and food policy 
chain;  
2.  To provide a buffer against extreme market or natural conditions and exceptional price 
falls; and to assist in the development of self-sustained schemes to reduce income 
volatility; 
3.  To ensure the availability of food supplies and to contribute to food security; 
4.  To ensure that food products reach consumers at competitive prices; 
5.  To meet consumer demand for safety and high quality food; 
6.  To preserve the natural resources of rural areas and to control pollution, with specific 
attention to environmentally sensitive and high-value portions of rural territories, to 
biodiversity and to ecosystems (note that the idea of considering organic farming 
according to its social benefits should be more explicitly mentioned); 
7.  To encourage a degree of farming activity in areas with natural handicaps. 
8.  To ensure that fiscal resources devoted to agriculture and rural programs are effective and 
the CAP is consistent with EU priorities and with other EU policies; 
9.  To harmonize effectiveness of support with equity among individuals and with cohesion 
across regions and member states; 
10. To require methods and processes of food production to be consistent with European 
values and ethics; 
11. To ensure a fair standard of living and to expand earning opportunities for rural 
populations; 
12. To ensure that the poorest and most deprived sections of the population have guaranteed 
access to food; 
13. To preserve the European heritage of food variety; 
14. To preserve the rural heritage of EU member states. 
Source: Bureau and Mahé (2008) 
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Figure 1: The Growth of Agricultural Protection in Europe 






















































































































































































































Figure 2: Self sufficiency in the EU - selected products 
 
 
Source: European Commission (2007) 
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Figure 3: EU Agricultural Budget as a percentage of the total EU budget 
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Figure 5: Evolution share of agricultural employment  
 








Figure 6: Change in agricultural employment (%) 
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Figure 7a: Share of agricultural labour in total employment and % PSE in 2007 
 
 
Source: ILO, national statistics 
 
Figure 7b: Change in agricultural labour and % PSE (’87-’07) 
 
 
Source: ILO, national statistics 
 
Figure 7c:Change in agricultural labour and Change in % PSE (’87-’07) 
 
Source: ILO, national statistics   31
Figure 8: Change in land rental prices in the NMS 
 
Source: Swinnen and Vranken (2008) 
 